Some thoughts on the Elections in Iran

Regardless of what will happen in the next few days, one of the striking features of current events in Iran is their resemblance to other political conjunctures of the past century. Things do seem to repeat themselves, albeit always in a different way. Of course the political scene and its actors are today quite distinct from the past. And yet, if one takes for a couple of minutes a more distant approach, one can notice “family resemblances”. There are many elements in what is happening today that are reminiscent of the constitutional revolution of 1906, elements that also recall the movement for the nationalization of oil in 1953 or make one think back to the Revolution of 1979 that instituted the Islamic Republic of Iran.
First of all, it is the rhythm itself of the events. A sudden acceleration of the political climate after years in which things were working “as usual.” As usual does not mean that there have not been significant events and transformations but that politics in everyday life has been characterized by a certain regularity.
Today instead, as in 1906, 1953, or 1979 the regular rhythm of things has precipitated into a fast pace, characterized by a sudden turn of events, often difficult to follow because comprised of so many different elements.
As in 1953 or 1979, today, faced with this acceleration, commentators and people alike are caught between interpreting what is happening either as “confusion” or as an organized “plot.” On the one hand, The immediate declaration of victory of the two candidates, the uncertainty of the aftermath, the different statements, the radically different depiction of what is happening between media that affirm the victory of Ahmadinejad and others that talk about a “coup,”—all these elements convey a sense of uncertainty and confusion, in which it is almost impossible to follow events and understand what is happening. There is a sense of emerging chaos. Politics here seems to be the result of a myriad of uncontrollable events and effects, to the extent that one does not understands anymore who decides what, what will happen next etc.
On the other hand however, everyone is speculating about the possible prearranged nature of the election, or the protests for that matter. Behind the confusion many read a design of one sort of another. Some point to the influence of foreign media and powers, others to the organizational force of the state itself etc. If one looks at 1953 and 1979, not for any lessons but for certain political patterns, both confusion and plotting where at work in a mixture of improvisation and strategy, and this is maybe a characteristic of Iranian politics that should be noted.
Second, the role of different political actors comes to the fore, and more specifically those of the crowd and of leaders. The crowd has been one of the most important political phenomena of Iran in the twentieth century. The crowd, that amorphous non-homogeneous association of people on the street that mobilize and disperse in a matters of hours, forceful and yet quite indecipherable, because fragmented and based on the immediacy of its presence, rather than on a clear political project. The crowd is not really a subject, in the sense of an agent endowed with a precise and directed will, but rather a milieu, a context for emotions and reactions, out of which different positions and subjects might emerge. Out of the crowd for example, at specific moments, the “people” are born as an actor, mobilizing and mobilized by this or that pretender or leader. But also “thugs” or “youth” or other subjects emerge from the crowd and take a more definite shape, but also a less overwhelming one, they are actors with more definite goals and desires, courses of actions and outcomes. The crowd instead is like a receptacle from which these different actors emerge but in itself is more indistinct than "youth" "reformists" "secularist" "hizbullah" or "thugs" and it is thus in some way a more powerful assemblage that reconfigures itself at every moment, protean and amorphous.
In 1906 the crowd made its appearance in Iranian politics when street protests called for the institution of a constitutional monarchy. The crowd was eventually defeated by cannons, though the heir to the throne did institute a parliament a few years later. The first appearance of the crowd was not as distinct as it was to become later, but nevertheless, gatherings of people in streets and squares became an important element of politics in Iran and have remained since then.
In 1953 the crowd took to the streets and squares to support Prime Minister Musaddiq and his project of nationalizing oil revenues in protest against the Shah. In a matter of hours another crowd (the same?) marched in favor of the Shah. The alternations of protests created a situation of uncertainty that eventually resulted in a coup and the destitution of Musaddiq. Historians have demonstrated once and for all that the crowd had been “manipulated” by a few “organizers” who had been paid by the CIA. Regardless, one should reflect on the particular affective power of this crowd, that, manipulated or not, assembles, protests and becomes a political actor. But what does the crowd assert? What is the statement of the crowd? In 1953 there were competing statements that eventually resulted in the political gain of the shah and his establishment.
In 1978-9, in the course of a few months, what had begun as an isolated protest became a mass movement that brought to the street the majority of the Iranian population, women and men, young and old, rich and poor. People with different, sometimes opposed political worldviews marched all together, eventually demanding the departure of the Shah. This became the unison cry of the crowd, a cry that was as forceful as vague. Beyond vagueness everyone in the crowd had different ideas about the future of Iran and this later lead to clashes and struggles within the revolutionary front, but one should also consider the force of that superficial and uniform statement: the shah must go.
Certainly the situation today is very different, and one should not compare, but rather use family resemblances to take notice. Again the combination of confusion and plotting has the crowd at its center. Soon after Ahmadinejad’s victory the crowd manifested itself and in the clashes found its raison d’etre. One of the first initiatives Ahmadinejad has taken is to organize a enormous rally to celebrate the victory, as if the “real” result of the elections were to be measured by the capacity to mobilize the crowd, to assemble people on the street in a show of support, and a to demonstrate the actuality of his electorate. The visual, mediatic element here should not be forgotten, and the elected president gave a press conference immediately preceding the event. Opponents pointed out --a routine comment for all organized mass events in the Islamic Republic-- that people had been brought by bus and given special work permits to attend. The two defeated opponents, Musavi and Karrubi are in turn claiming a crowd of their own. Musavi called for a protest for tomorrow, Tuesday June 16, the Ministry of Interior denied permission and he cancelled the demonstration fearing that the “crowd” might be harmed. One sees the importance of turning the crowd into a recognizable “people”—that is a people to whom a political stand, a strategy a slogan can be attributed. At the moment one does not know if the crowd will find its statement and what kind of political consequences that will bring. What is of note however is that, confused and plotted, the crowd is the indistinct out of which politics is born in Iran.
Leaders as well seem to be under the spell of repetition. Certainly one has to free associate in order to draw some conceptual parallels and be very cautious not to forget how different from the past are things today. But making associations might help to throw some light on what is happening. Not in terms of predictions, but rather as ways of posing questions. Among leaders too “confusion” and “plots” are in evidence.
At the top, an isolated figure detains the ultimate power, at least on paper. Depicted as either all-powerful or manipulated (plotting, plotted or instead confused)-- he is the ultimate target, the symbol of the order of things. As every symbol it is endowed either with an immense capacity to act, to decide, to repress or instead with a very limited one, himself controlled by others or simply incapable to impress a course of action. There is no structural resemblance between the position of the shah in 1906, 1953 or 1979 and that of the supreme leader, nor any similarity in personality or outlook. Laws (the sharia and the laws of the Republic) bind the supreme leader. Even if he has authority on both, he has to act within their frame, though he can use one against the other.
The parallel that one can make however, and it is an important one, is the image of a sole figure at the top, depicted as quite lonely, even detached. He can be seen as controlling the situation or instead being controlled, but there remains this strong image of an individual at the top who has, or could have, the last word on the question. This embodiment of power has several consequences. It establishes a political landscape that is at once absolute and reversible, as if from the opinion, the actions or the ideas of this person depended the articulation of the whole political system, which is therefore seen itself as both absolute and reversible. And this is in itself a call to the crowd, its counterpoint. As the leader is the embodied individuation of power, the crowd is the embodied diffusion of power—both absolute and reversible and thus dependent on each other.
Around him, other leaders struggling against each other. Many have noted how this elections have marked a shift in the arguments and rhetoric the candidates used during the campaign. Though fierce political struggles have been part of the Islamic Republic since its inception, never have candidates accused their rivals so openly, often verging on insults. This has created not only opposed camps, but a real sense of difference, of possible alternatives. It is impossible to say at the moment, however it does seems that what made the crowd associate, especially for the opposition, was this sense of difference, however indeterminate that might be, more than a concrete alternative political vision.
Both Ahmadinejad and Musavi are as much a product of the crowd as their assemblers. Ahmadinejad in his press conference stated that it was the “people” of Iran who made their decision. An equal claim comes from Musavi, in his accusation of vote manipulation. For Ahmadinejad this is more than just a populist strategy. It is an art of government that works as much through communication as through money. For the contender communication is even more important, as the effort to claim for himself the “will of the people” is now doubled.
Both confusion and plot play an important role in the ways in which the actions and words of the president and his contenders are interpreted, by the media and the crowd. The key to understand what is happening is in this relation. To whom plots will finally be attributed? And towards what claims? How will “chaos” be deciphered? Who will win the battle of interpretation in the short run, might loose it in the long run, as the underneath, forcefully denied will come back again and again to undermine and derail the strategies of the victors.
There is something in between the idea that things happen in Iran out of a confused assemblage and the idea that there is an underlying design that guides events. There is something that holds this tension together between confusion and plotting and constitutes it as the main framework for thinking about politics. It is a claim to truth. Whoever or whatever can speak for the truth, can really state things as they are, establishes the ground for legitimacy and recognition. Who really won the election? From the perspective that privileges the idea that political events in Iran take place in a state of and because of confusion as well as from the perspective that they take place because of plotting, the question of truth might seem quite futile. The elections after all could be seen as just a tactic in a play of power, either by the president and his entourage or by his opponents who try to seize the opportunity. And yet, the question of truth will continue to resonate and as many commentators observe, might never be resolved. The “truth” about the 1953 coup finally emerged, with full documentation—but what mattered more and maybe still does is the power that the “truth” of 1953 exercised for so many years over the crowds of Iran. How will the “truth” of these elections play out?
History repeats itself through difference, and no one knows how events will unfold in the next few hours or days. What can be said however is that a lot will depend on how this claim of truth will be articulated between confusion and plotting.